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Boyle: Tax Consequences of Equitable Adjustments

TAX CONSEQUENCES OF EQUITABLE
ADJUSTMENTS
F.

LADSON BOYLE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The tax consequences of equitable adjustments are largely
uncharted. Only one published tax decision has so far considered
the issue. Nevertheless, it is arguable, by analogy to other litigated issues, that equitable adjustments produce income, gift,
and estate tax consequences to the beneficiaries of estates, and
in particular to beneficiaries who serve as executors.'
In recent years, discussions of equitable adjustments have
become common. 2 Although unknown in many jurisdictions, eq* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. B.S., College of Charleston, 1969; J.D., University of South Carolina School of Law, 1974; LL.M.
(in Taxation), New York University, 1975.
A portion of the materials that follow are reprinted from an article by the author

that first appeared in the April-May issue of

NEWS FROM DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUST

copyright 1986 by McGraw-Hill, Inc. Reprinted with permission of Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, Inc. Further reproduction is strictly prohibited.
1. The fiduciary of an estate can be a male, a female, a corporation, or two or more
individuals or corporations. For consistency of style and brevity of expression, this Article will use masculine nouns and pronouns to refer to this fiduciary.
2. R. CovEY, MARITAL DEDUCTION AND CREDIT SHELTER DISPOSITIONS AND THE USE OF
FORMULA PROVISIONS (1984); E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DEAGREEMENTS,

CEDENT'S ESTATES AND TRUSTS

722-806 (3d Ed. 1981); Ascher, The Fiduciary Duty to

Minimize Taxes, 20 REAL PROP. PROB. & T. J. 663 (1985); Berall, PracticalApproaches
to Avoiding or Making Equitable Adjustments, ABA Section of Taxation, May 19, 1984
Meeting, Washington. D.C.; Blattmachr, A Primer on the Effects of Equitable Adjustments, 124 TR. & EST. 21 (June 1985). Blattmachr, The Tax Effects of Equitable Adjustments: An Internal Revenue Code Odyssey, 18 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 14-1 (1984)[hereinafter cited as Blattmachr, Tax Effects]; Carrico, Advanced Problems with Equitable
Adjustments, ABA Section of Taxation, Annual Advanced Study Sessions: Advanced
Taxation of Income of Trusts and Estates (1983)[hereinafter cited as Carrico, Advanced
Problems]; Carrico, Equitable Adjustments and Related Professional Responsibility
Problems in Estate Planning, 37 So. CALIF. TAX INST. 191 (1985)[hereinafter cited as
Carrico, Equitable Adjustments]; Carrico & Bondurant, Equitable Adjustments: A Survey and Analysis of Precedents and Practice,36 TAx LAW. 545 (1983); Dobris, Limits on
the Doctrine of Equitable Adjustment in SophisticatedPostmortem Tax Planning,66
IOWA L. REV. 273 (1981)[hereinafter cited as Dobris, Limits]; Dobris, Equitable Adjustments in Postmortem Income Tax Planning:An Unremitting Diet of Warms, 65 IOWA
L. REV. 103 (1979)[hereinafter cited as Dobris, Equitable Adjustments]; Moore, Conflict-
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uitable adjustments have a long history in some states.3 The
need to make an adjustment arises when an executor, by making
certain tax elections, breaches one of many fiduciary duties,
often to comply with another duty having a higher priority. Typically, the election enriches one group of estate beneficiaries at
the expense of another group.
Equitable adjustments first arose as a judicial reaction to
the unfair consequences that arise from the breach of a fiduciary
duty. An equitable adjustment allocates estate income to the
disadvantaged beneficiaries to compensate for the inequity, even
though the allocation is often contrary to state fiduciary accounting principles.
Two types of equitable adjustments, both derived from New
York surrogate court cases,' are well established in some
states-the Warms adjustment and the Holloway adjustment.
The potential exists, however, for many other types. In approximately thirty-four states, equitable adjustments are not established by statute or by judicial precedent and are not in common
practice. 5 Nevertheless, equitable adjustments are possible in
most states.6
The setting for a Warms adjustment, one of the two common types of equitable adjustments, is easily illustrated. The executor of an estate can elect to deduct estate administration expenses as either estate tax deductions or income tax deductions.7
If deducted on the estate tax return, the tax benefit of the deduction typically inures to the estate's principal beneficiaries.
An election to deduct the expenses on one or more of the estate's income tax returns, however, transfers the tax savings of
the deduction to the estate's income beneficiaries. Since estate
administration expenses are generally paid out of principal
rather than income, under applicable rules of fiduciary account-

ing Interests in Postmortem Planning,9 INST. ON EST. PL. 19-1 (1975); Moore, Conflicts
in Post-mortem Planning after the Tax Reform Act, 12 INST. ON EST. PL. 6-1 (1978).
3. See Carrico & Bondurant, supra note 2, at 605-28.
4. In re Estate of Warms, 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sur. Ct. 1955); In re Estate of Holloway, 67 Misc. 2d 132, 323 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sur. Ct. 1971), rev'd, 68 Misc. 2d 361, 327
N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sur. Ct. 1972).
5. Carrico, Equitable Adjustments, supra note 2, at 19-7 to -8.
6. See infra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
7. I.R.C. § 642(g).
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ing,8 an election to deduct the expenses on income tax returns
shifts any benefit of the deduction away from the beneficiaries
who bear the cost of the expense. An equitable adjustment, however, if made, restores the estate principal by reallocating estate
income to the principal account. The other established equitable
adjustment, a Holloway adjustment, will be explained in detail
below.9
Equitable adjustments may produce income, gift, and estate
tax consequences for estate beneficiaries and executors. If an equitable adjustment is owed, but not made, an income tax consequence may arise.1" By contrast, if a beneficiary is due an equitable adjustment and does not assert his right to it, a gift may
result.1" If a beneficiary dies, the potential equitable adjustment
may represent an asset of the new estate or may decrease the
value of the new estate.'2 For the fiduciary who is also a beneficiary, the power to make an equitable adjustment in the fiduciary's absolute discretion may be a general power of appointment; if it is, the beneficiary-executor may encounter additional
income, gift, and estate tax problems.' All these consequences
may exist whether or not the adjustment is actually made. In
addition, varying state law precedent for equitable adjustments
multiplies the number of potential tax issues.
It is impossible to devise any one simple drafting solution
for all the tax problems because of the number of potential equitable adjustments, the varying state law, and the wide variety of
factual contexts in which adjustments can arise. Nevertheless,
carefully tailored drafting can eliminate the problems. Estate
planners, however, must analyze equitable adjustment issues on
a client by client basis since the solution in one case may not
work in another.
This Article has four objectives. First, it explains the factual
settings and the mechanics for the two common equitable adjustments. Second, it explores the potential for equitable adjustments in jurisdictions where they are not now made. Third, it

8.

REv. UNI?. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT § 5(a), 7B U.L.A. 145, 160 (1985).
9. See infra subpart II(C).
10. See infra subpart III(B)(1).
11. See infra subpart III(A)(2).
12. See infra subparts III(A)(3), III(B)(2).
13. See infra subpart III(C).
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analyzes the tax consequences of equitable adjustments for beneficiaries and executors of estates. Finally, it suggests some
drafting solutions to the problems facing estate planners and
their clients.

II. THE ADJUSTMENT
A.

The Origins of Equitable Adjustments: FiduciaryDuties

The executor of an estate is a fiduciary and must act in the
best interests of the estate beneficiaries. To do otherwise is a
breach of his duty for which he can be surcharged. While an executor has many specific fiduciary duties, it is possible to identify at least four that can interact to create the need for equitable adjustments. 14 These four are the duties: (1) to be
impartial, 15 (2) to conserve the estate,"6 (3) to account for estate
principal and income in accordance with state law (typically the
Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act 1 7 or a similar statute), and (4) to report income of the estate in the manner required by Subchapter J of the Internal Revenue Code. i8 In the
context of equitable adjustments, the duty to conserve the estate
can be described as the duty to minimize the total taxes of the
estate, both income and estate taxes.' 9
An inherent potential for conflict exists among the executor's duties. For example, the duty to conserve the estate and
save taxes may require the executor to violate the duty to be
impartial. Similarly, the duty to conserve may conflict with the
duty to account for estate income and principle according to local fiduciary accounting principles. Under established precedent
the need for equitable adjustments arises when two duties conflict in such a way that the executor cannot avoid breaching one
14. Carrico & Bondurant, supra note 2; Dobris, Limits, supra note 2; Dobris, Equitable Adjustments, supra note 2.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959); 2 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS

§ 183 (3d ed. 1987); In re Estate of Bixby, 140 Cal. App. 2d 326, 334, 295 P.2d 68, 73
(1956).
16. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 176 (1959); 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 15, §

176.
17. REv. UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT § 5, 7B U.L.A. 145, 160 (1985). As of 1986,
29 states have adopted the Revised Act. Id at 145.
18. I.R.C. §§ 641-92.
19. Ascher, supra note 2.
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B. The Warms Adjustment
The Warms adjustment, which is the best known equitable
adjustment, derives its name from In re Estate of Warms,20 the
first reported decision to recognize the fiduciary obligation to
adjust the shares of beneficiaries for the adverse impact of a tax
election. In Warms the decedent bequeathed two-fifths of his estate to his nieces and the remainder to his spouse in trust for
life. 21 The executor of Mr. Warms' estate elected to deduct the
estate administration expenses as income tax deductions rather
than as estate tax deductions. The failure to claim the expenses
as estate tax deductions increased the estate taxes payable out
of the principal of the residuary. 22 Deducting the administration
expenses on the income tax returns, on the other hand, reduced
the estate income tax liability. Because the residuary beneficiaries did not receive all the tax savings of the income tax deduction, a New York surrogate's court required the estate's income account to reimburse the estate's principal account for the
extra estate taxes.
The following example illustrates the need for a Warms
adjustment:
Example 1. A dies in 1986 with a $2,000,000 gross estate. He
leaves everything to a trust that is to pay all the income to his
daughter, D, for life and the remainder to his son, S, at D's
death. The will directs that all estate taxes and expenses of
administration be paid out of the residuary estate. Deductible
administration expenses total $200,000.
If the executor elects to deduct the administration expenses on
the estate tax return, the principal passing to the trust, after
taxes and expenses, totals $1,265,000.23 On the other hand, if the

20. 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sur. Ct. 1955).
21. The bequest in trust apparently did not qualify for the estate tax marital

deduction.
22. I.R.C. § 2053 permits the deduction of estate administration expenses in deter-

mining the adjusted gross estate. Additional deductions are permitted in determining the
taxable estate. Not deducting the expenses on the estate tax return causes the adjusted

gross estate and the taxable estate to be larger and the tax liability larger.
23. In 1986 estate taxes on a $1,800,000 taxable estate (gross estate of $2,000,000
less $200,000 of expenses) equal $535,000. This example assumes that state death taxes
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executor of the estate elects to deduct the administration expenses on the estate's income tax returns, 24 the net estate passing to the trust totals $1,175,000.25 If it is assumed that the estate can deduct the expenses in a 50% income tax bracket, the
$200,000 of administration expenses saves the estate $100,000 in
income taxes, but the estate taxes increase by $90,000.
Thus, the executor's decision to deduct the administration
expenses on the income tax returns reduces the principal of the
residuary estate by $90,000. Since fiduciary accounting income is
normally computed without reduction for estate administration
expenses, the daughter's net income increases by $100,000,
which produces a dramatic shift of assets from the trust to the
daughter. Nevertheless, if the estate's income tax bracket is
higher than the estate tax bracket, the executor has a 26clear duty
to make the election to reduce the total tax liability.

Although the tax law permits the executor to elect between
the estate tax deduction and the income tax deduction, state fiduciary accounting law does not. 27 Estate administration expenses are a charge against principal, not income. 28 Since the
election provides a benefit for the estate's income account at a
substantial cost to the principal account, its exercise violates the
fiduciary duty to be impartial and is contrary to fiduciary accounting rules. At the same time, however, the election discharges the executor's duty to conserve the estate.
When the duty to conserve conflicts with the duty to be impartial and violates fiduciary accounting rules, equity intercedes.
A Warms adjustment reallocates estate income to offset the adverse consequences of the tax election. The mechanics of effecting this adjustment in example 1 are easy to illustrate. Under
normal fiduciary accounting rules, A's daughter would receive all

equal the state death tax credit. The net estate passing to the trust is, thus, $1,265,000
($2,000,000 less $200,000 of expenses and less $535,000 of estate taxes).
24. I.R.C. § 642(g) permits an executor to elect between an income tax deduction or
an estate tax deduction for most estate expenses unless § 691(b) is applicable. If it is,
these expenses are deductible on both returns.
25. Estate taxes on a $2,000,000 taxable estate in 1986 equal $625,000. This example
assumes that state death taxes equal the state death tax credit. The net estate passing to
the trust is, thus, $1,175,000 ($2,000,000, less $200,000 of expenses, still chargeable to
principal, and less $625,000 of estate taxes).

26. Ascher, supra note 2.
27. REV. UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INcOME ACT § 5(a), 7B U.L.A. 145, 160 (1985).

28. Id.
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the income generated in the estate. 9 The Warms adjustment,
however, directs $90,000 of the estate income to the principal
account. The daughter then receives the remaining income.3 0
Since the executor who makes the Warms adjustment accomplishes the entire transaction on his books of account, no
money actually changes hands. The executor simply makes a
charge to the income account and a credit to the principal account. It is as though the executor takes money out of one
pocket and puts it in another. Thus, the adjustment restores the
amount of the estate principal to the size it would have been if
the executor had not made the income tax election.
The Warms adjustment is either in common practice or required by law in New York,3 1 Florida, 2 California, 3 and twelve

29. REV. UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME Aar § 5(b), 7B U.L.A. 145, 160 (1985).
30. The Warms opinion did not discuss the mechanics of the Warms adjustment. It
is arguable that there is more than one way to divide the tax savings if the potential
recipient of an equitable adjustment receives a portion of the income tax savings under
the local principal and income act.
An example better illustrates the issue. M dies in 1986 with a $2,000,000 gross estate. He leaves $632,500 to a trust for the benefit of his daughter and the residuary
outright to his son. If estate administration expenses are $200,000, the value of the residuary estate is also $632,500. An election by the executor to deduct the estate administration"expenses on the estate's income tax returns, however, increases the estate taxes by
$90,000 and reduces the residuary estate by the same amount. If it is assumed that the
income tax deductions save $100,000 in income taxes, a Warms adjustment can restore
the residuary to its former size with $10,000 left over.
Based on these facts, without considering the tax election and a possible equitable
adjustment, the trust and the residuary bequest evenly divide estate income under the
RUPIA. If the tax election is made and an equitable adjustment is considered, the question becomes whether the estate income is divided before the Warms adjustment or after. If the income is divided first, each beneficiary receives $50,000. The Warms adjustment then takes $40,000 of income from the trust, but leaves the trust with the $10,000
of overall tax savings. In the alternative, if the residuary receives the Warms adjustment
before the division of estate income, the residuary receives the $90,000 it needs to be
made whole and then receives $5,000, or one-half of the remaining estate income that
results from the tax election.
The court in In re Estate of Bixby, 140 Cal. App. 2d 326, 339, 295 P.2d 68, 76 (1956),
followed the second method, but performed the math a little differently. On the other
hand, the petitioners in Warms were satisfied to be made whole and did not seek any
portion of the net tax savings. Two New York decisions, In re Estate of Inman, 22 Misc.
2d 573, 196 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sur. Ct. 1959), and In re Estate of Levy, 9 Misc. 2d 561, 167
N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sur. Ct. 1957), required Warms adjustments and discussed the mechanics.
While both of these decisions were far less specific than Bixby, both required the income
account to reimburse the principal account. The language of the courts implies that the
reimbursement occurs before the income account is apportioned among the estate's income beneficiaries.
31. N.Y. EsT. Pow.Rs & TRusTs LAW § 11-1.2(B) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
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other states.3 4 Michigan prohibits adjustments by statute.35 In
the remaining states, Warms adjustments are neither prohibited
nor in common practice.3 6
C. The Holloway Adjustment
The estate administration expenses election is only one of
several tax created inequities that can provide a basis for equitable adjustments. Another inequity arises when an estate makes a
distribution of principal to a beneficiary and a portion of the
distribution is treated as taxable income. Under the distributable net income (DNI) rules, 37 sections3" 661 and 662 of the Internal Revenue Code, funds designated as principal for fiduciary
accounting purposes may be taxable income for federal income
tax purposes. The DNI rules provide that if an estate makes a
distribution, it may carry out taxable income to the recipient, 39
even if the distribution is fiduciary accounting principal. 0 On
occasion an executor will deliberately cause trust accounting
principal to be treated as taxable income. This technique, sometimes called a "trapping distribution," can save significant
amounts of income taxes in some circumstances. 4 '
32. In re Veith's Estate, 26 Fla. Supp. 145 (Cir. Ct. 1965).
33. In re Estate of Bixby, 140 Cal. App. 2d 326, 295 P.2d 68 (1956).
34. Carrico, Equitable Adjustments, supra note 2, at 19-7 to -8.
35. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 700.829(2) (West 1980).
36. Carrico, Equitable Adjustments, supra note 2, at 19-7 to -8. According to an

American College of Probate Counsel survey, South Carolina is a state where equitable
adjustments are not made. See CARRICO & BONDURANTr, supra note 2, at 616. The survey's accuracy, however, is uncertain. In 1986 the author of this Article conducted a
survey of the twenty Board Certified Estate Planners in South Carolina. Approximately
50% responded. Of those who did, 5 indicated that they rarely made equitable adjustments, 1 indicated that he made them often, and the remainder indicated that they
never made adjustments. In addition, the author surveyed the four largest South Carolina bank trust departments. One did not respond, one indicated that it never made
adjustments, one indicated that it rarely made equitable adjustments, and one indicated
that it always made equitable adjustments.
37. A discussion of DNI is beyond the scope of this Article, but DNI is discussed in
detail in anumber of treatises and articles. See, e.g., M. FERGUSON, J. FREELAND & R.
STEPHENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND BENEFICIARIES (1970).
38. Unless otherwise indicated, all uses of "section" or "sections" refers to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
39. Distributions carry out DNI unless I.R.C. § 663(a)(1) provides an exception.
40. Harkness v. United States, 469 F.2d 310 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
41. Several commentators discuss trapping distributions in great detail. See, e.g.,
Cornfeld, Trapping Distributions,14 INST. ON EST. PL, 14-1 (1980); Englebracht & Helm-

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss4/4

8

1986]

ADJUSTMENTS
Boyle: Tax
Consequences
of Equitable Adjustments
EQUITABLE

Because distributions may carry out DNI, a recipient must
report income to the extent of DNI received. 42 As a consequence,
the estate's fiduciary accounting income is not taxed in full because the estate receives an income tax deduction equal to the
distribution. Subsequent distribution of the accumulated estate
income in a later year has no income tax consequence. 43 In summary, the recipient of the principal pays income taxes on principal, while the estate's accumulated income is subsequently distributed income tax free.
Here, as in the Warms scenario, the disparity between fiduciary accounting rules and income tax reporting creates a conflict for the fiduciary. In In re Estate of Holloway,44 a New York
surrogate's court ordered an equitable adjustment when a distribution of principal was treated as income for federal income tax
purposes. In that case a trust created under Mr. Holloway's will
received a distribution from the estate, and the income tax laws
treated a portion of the principal as income. When a guardian
ad litem for minor beneficiaries petitioned the court for an equitable adjustment, the New York court required the income account to make restitution to the principal.4 5
The following example illustrates the need for a Holloway
adjustment:
Example 2. B dies in 1986 with a $1,000,000 gross estate and
leaves $500,000 outright to his surviving spouse, using a pecuniary formula marital deduction clause, and the remainder to
his children. In 1987 the estate has net income of $100,000.
For income tax purposes, a distribution of the entire marital
bequest in 1987, if there are no other distributions, is $400,000

bright, The Use of Trapping Distributionsin Post-Mortem Tax Planning,59 TAXEs 716
(1981); Mulligan, Timing is the Key to Cutting Estate Income Through Making of
Trapping Distributions,50 J. TAx. 342 (1979).
42. I.R.C. § 662.
43. Distribution of accumulated income by an estate does not invoke the throwback
rules, which are limited to distributions by trusts. See Trees. Reg. § 1.665(a)-OA(d). If
the distribution of the accumulated income occurs at a time when the estate has DNI,
the distribution is treated as taxable income to the extent of DNL
44. 68 Misc. 2d 361, 327 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sur. Ct. 1972).
45. In its first opinion the court did not grant the request. Upon rehearing, however,

the New York State Bankers Association filed an amicus curiae brief and told the court
that adjustments were common. Id. at 362, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
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of principal and $100,000 of income. 46 The surviving spouse pays
income taxes on the $100,000 of income the estate received and
retained; the estate pays no income taxes. 47 If, on the first day of
the next tax year, the estate distributes all remaining assets including the $100,000 of accumulated income, the residuary beneficiaries receive the accumulated fiduciary income free of income
taxes.
In the example the estate saved at least $41,000 in income
taxes,4 but the widow's income taxes increased at least
$37,000. 49 If an equitable adjustment is made, the estate reimburses the widow for the additional income taxes she paid, but
the estate keeps the excess savings.50 The mechanics of the adjustment are less clear if the widow's income tax cost exceeds
the estate's income tax savings since no case has thus far considered this possibility. 51 The amount of the adjustment, however,
52
is probably limited to the estate's income tax savings.
Only one reported decision directly followed Holloway. In
Salesky Estate53 the Pennsylvania Orphan's Court required a
Holloway type adjustment as a result of a distribution of principle that was treated as income. In Estate of Cooper v. Parkinson,54 a Florida appellate court seemed to imply that it would
follow Holloway. Subsequently, however, in Williams v. Harrington,55 another Florida court specifically declined to make an
equitable adjustment. In Williams the widow elected against the
will and petitioned for her elective share. Upon distribution the
elective share was treated as taxable income. According to the
court, the widow's election and the tax laws, rather than any act

46. If there are other distributions during the tax year, the DNI is divided among
the recipients. See I.R.C. § 662.
47. A formula marital bequest does not qualify for the exception to the DNI rule of
I.R.C. § 663(a)(1). See Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-1(b).
48. Income taxes of the estate are computed by using 1985 rates for estates, assuming the estate has $100,000 of taxable income.
49. Estimated income taxes are computed by using the 1985 rates for a single indi-

vidual, assuming that the beneficiary has no other income.
50. Salesky Estate, 15 Pa. Fiduc. 213 (Orphans' Ct. 1965).

51. Salesky Estate, 15 Pa. Fiduc. 213, 216 (Orphans' Ct. 1965), implies that the equitable adjustment is limited to the income tax savings achieved by the estate.
52. It is possible that the executor may be surcharged if the extra tax cost was
avoidable. He has potentially violated his duty to conserve the estate.
53. 15 Pa. Fiduc. 213 (Orphans' Court 1965).
54. 186 So. 2d 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
55. 460 So. 2d 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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of the executor, triggered the adverse tax consequences. The
court distinguished inequities caused by the executor's acts from
those caused by the beneficiary and held that the latter did not
warrant an equitable adjustment. This distinction seems valid.
When a fiduciary intentionally makes a distribution of principal
that the tax law treats as income, he deliberately violates the
duty to be impartial; in these circumstances, the equitable adjustment is appropriate. In Williams, however, the executor did
not create the problem by sophisticated planning; the beneficiary brought it upon herself. Other courts have used the same
distinction to reject equitable adjustments in other circumstances.5 6
Two methods are available for effecting the Holloway adjustment. The executor can make a bookkeeping entry similar to
the one described above for a Warms adjustment, 57 or he can
make an additional distribution to the beneficiary as reimbursement for the tax cost of the first distribution. As explained later,
the method selected can cause different tax consequences to the
recipient.
D.

Unlimited Marital Deduction

A significant equitable adjustment issue arises from the interplay of a marital deduction formula clause and the election to
deduct estate administration expenses on the estate's income tax
return. In this context an election to deduct expenses on the income tax return has a substantial effect on the beneficiaries.
The following example illustrates 'the significance of this
election:
Example 3. C dies in 1986 with a $1,000,000 gross estate. He
leaves the maximum marital deduction (less the unified credit
equivalent) to his spouse in trust, using a pecuniary formula
clause, and the residuary estate outright to his children by a
former marriage. Estate administration expenses are $100,000.
In this example, if the executor deducts the estate administration expenses on the estate tax return, the widow's trust re-

56. In re Estate of Dick, 29 Misc. 2d 648, 218 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Sur. Ct. 1961). But see
Dobris, Equitable Adjustments, supra note 2, at 143.
57. See supra subpart H(B).
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ceives $400,000, 58 and the children receive $500,000. 59 If, however, the executor elects to deduct the administration expenses
on the estate's income tax returns instead, the allocation of estate assets is different. The widow's trust must receive $500,000
to avoid payment of estate taxes.6 0 Since the testator's intent is
generally the elimination of estate taxes, the unlimited marital
deduction formula increases the marital bequest." As a result,
the children receive $400,000,62 or $100,000 less than if the expenses are deducted on the estate tax return. This reallocation
has a substantial economic impact on the residuary.
An executor with the power to make this election is in a
very difficult position. His duty to be impartial is in direct conflict with his clear duty to save taxes .6 No matter where the
expenses are deducted, no estate taxes are due. An income tax
deduction, however, achieves an immediate tax savings if sufficient income is generated to make use of the deduction. Only by
looking at the widow's potential estate tax liability, at her death,
can the executor find any justification for not electing to deduct
the administration expenses on the income tax returns, which is
speculative in many situations.
This example does not, however, result in a Warms adjustment. In Warms the income account reimburses the principal
account for the estate tax cost of not deducting the expenses on
the estate tax return. The measure of the adjustment is the
amount of additional estate taxes payable. In the example there
are no additional estate taxes.
What is the judicial response to this shift in assets? Few
courts have considered the issue, but those that have, with only

58. A $1,000,000 gross estate less $400,000 marital deduction and less $100,000 administration expenses leaves a taxable estate of $500,000. No estate taxes are due after
taking into account the unified credit.
59. A $1,000,000 gross estate less $400,000 marital deduction and less $100,000 administration expenses leave $500,000.
60. A $1,000,000 gross estate less $500,000 marital deduction leaves a $500,000 taxable estate. No taxes are due after taking into account the unified credit.
61. Rev. Rul. 55-643, 1955-2 C.B. 386; R. Covsy, supra note 2, at 29, 123 (1984);
Blattmachr, Tax Effects, supra note 2, 1 1403.1, at 14-7; Evans, Administrative Powers
and the MaritalDeduction, 20 REAL PROP. PROB. & T& J. 1161 (1985).
62. A $1,000,000 gross estate less $100,000 administration expenses and less a
$500,000 marital deduction leaves $400,000.
63. The testator may relieve the executor of his obligation by including a provision
to that effect in his will.
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one exception, 4 have declined to require an adjustment.6 5 The
one decision that ordered an adjustment was later overruled by
legislative action6 6 and distinguished by the court that made the
decision.6 7 If a court were to require an adjustment, an estate
tax liability would be created, contrary to the frequently expressed intent of testators to eliminate federal estate taxes by
maximizing the marital deduction.
E.

Other Adjustments

A number of other situations also create "inequities" that
might justify equitable adjustments. Nearly every election or decision by an executor has the potential to cause a shift of assets
from. one group of beneficiaries to another.6 Disproportionate
distributions to equal beneficiaries of an estate can create the

need for an adjustment.6 9 The differences between tax accounting and fiduciary accounting cause a net after tax difference

probably not intended by the testator. Electing a tax year for
the estate or the timing of the final distributions to close an estate can also create inequities among beneficiaries.
The Qualified Terminal Interest Property (QTIP) election
presents an additional equitable adjustment problem that is un64. In re Estate of Levy, 9 Misc. 2d 561, 167 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sur. Ct. 1957).
65. In re Veith's Estate, 26 Fla. Supp. 145 (Cir. Ct. 1965); In re Estate of
McTarnahan, 27 Misc. 2d 13, 202 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sur. Ct. 1960); In re Estate of Inman, 22
Misc. 2d 573, 196 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sur. Ct. 1959).
66. N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUST LAW § 11-1.2(B) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
67. Id. § 11-1.2(B); In re Estate of McTarnahan, 27 Misc. 2d 13, 202 N.Y.S.2d 618
(Sur. Ct. 1960).
68. A new potential adjustment arose with the addition of I.R.C. § 643(d) to the
Internal Revenue Code. This section provides that a distribution of assets in kind by an
estate carries out DNI only to the extent of the asset's adjusted basis or fair market
value, whichever is less. The beneficiary's adjusted basis in the asset received equals the
estate's adjusted basis. In the alternative, the executor can elect to recognize gain or loss
on the distribution. If the election is made, the distribution carries out DNI to the extent
of fair market value, and the beneficiary's adjusted basis equals fair market value.
The § 643(d) election, as other tax elections, has the potential to cause an equitable
adjustment. For example, the recipient of the assets reports more income if the election
is made. The estate has less income tax, but a gain is incurred. Fiduciary accounting
rules are unlikely to place the benefit of the election where the taxes fall, and the basis
for an equitable adjustment exists. Since this provisions is new, Michigan, which prohibits all adjustments, is the only state where the status of this potential equitable adjustment is clear.
69. See In re Estate of Cooper v. Parkinson, 186 So. 2d 844 (Fla. Dist Ct. App.
1966); Salesky Estate, 15 Pa. Fiduc. 213 (Orphans' Ct. 1965).
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resolved and has not been widely discussed by commentators,."
An executor with the discretion to make a QTIP election has the
power to defer estate taxes by making the election or to forgo

any election and cause a current estate tax.71 The QTIP election,
thus, has the potential to shift assets among beneficiaries. Although no court has considered this issue, the precedent of the
cases denying an equitable adjustment on facts similar to example 3 should be applicable. 2
The total number of potential equitable adjustments is considerable. For example, one commentator has identified sixteen
in addition to the Warms and Holloway adjustments. 3

70. Ascher, The Quandaryof Executors Who Are Asked to Plan the Estates of the
Dead: The Qualified Terminable Interest Property Election, 63 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1984);
Berall, supra note 2; Carrico, Equitable Adjustments, supra note 2.
71. The following example illustrates the problem:
D dies in 1986 with an estate of $1,000,000. His will leaves the widow the maximum marital deduction (less the unified credit equivalent) in a QTIP trust,
which will go to "their" children on her death. The residuary estate goes outright to his children by an earlier marriage.
Putting aside the administration expenses issue, each set of children will eventually
receive $500,000, free of federal estate taxes. If, however, the widow is wealthy in her
own right, and has $500,000 of her own assets, she might decide, if named executrix, to
forgo the QTIP election in D's estate. This causes D's estate to pay $190,000 in estate
taxes out of the residuary (and out of the assets of the first set of children).
If she also dies in 1986, her children receive $1,000,000, and his children receive
$310,000. If D's estate elects the QTIP marital deduction and she dies in 1986, either the
QTIP marital trust or her separate assets pay $190,000 of estate taxes. Her children
receive $810,000, and his children receive $500,000. The widow, with the discretion to
make a QTIP election, has the power to take $190,000 away from his other children and
give them to her children.
It is not clear that the widow can make such a selfish election without violating the
fiduciary duty to be impartial. At least one court has determined that when a conflict of
interest arises, the fiduciary owes a higher duty to the other beneficiaries and must exercise elections to her own detriment. See In re Estate of Colp, N.Y.L.J., January 20, 1976,
at 8, col 2 (Sur. Ct. 1976). This case, however, has been criticized. See Ascher, supra note
2, at 711-13. If this case is valid, however, the widow may be surcharged if she forgoes
the QTIP election.
Although no reported decision has resolved this conflict, the cases cited supra note
65 seem applicable. The Connecticut legislature passed a statute in 1983 to prohibit adjustments for the consequences of a QTIP election. Notwithstanding the current precedent, it is foreseeable that some court, somewhere, will require an adjustment if the facts
are similar to those in the example and if extrinsic evidence suggests that the decedent
assumed that the election would be made.
72. See In re Veith's Estate, 26 Fla. Supp. 145 (Cir. Ct. 1965); In re Estate of
McTarnahan, 27 Misc. 2d 13, 202 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sur. Ct. 1960); In re Estate of Inman, 22
Misc. 2d 573, 196 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sur. Ct. 1959).
73. Carrico, Equitable Adjustments, supra note 2.
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F. Possible Proliferationin Other Jurisdictions
There is a potential for a Warms adjustment in states where
equitable adjustments are not now required. In any of these
states, a petition to a court of equity, based on facts similar to
Warms, should result in an adjustment. No reported court decision has refused to make a Warms adjustment, 74 and in at least
fifteen states it is accepted either by statute or by court
75
decision.

The Holloway adjustment is less widely accepted; Holloway 76 and Salesky77 are the only reported decisions directly on
point. In In re Estate of Coe,78 the decedent's will granted the

executor discretion to settle all questions of income and principal. Nevertheless, the fiduciary declined to make an adjustment,
and a New York surrogate's court refused to surcharge him for
his failure to make an adjustment. The Williams court in Florida also declined to make a Holloway adjustment. 79
Despite the lack of judicial mandate, a court is likely to require a Holloway adjustment if the facts of a case are similar to
Holloway. No reported decision has denied an equitable adjustment on facts comparable to those in Holloway, and the use of
Holloway adjustments is widespread in some parts of the
country.80

In addition, it is possible to interpret the Revised Uniform
Principal and Income Act (RUPIA) to require Warms and Holloway adjustments.81 Although neither Warms nor Holloway was

74. The court in In re Estate of Backus, 106 Misc. 2d 463, 434 N.Y.S. 2d 106 (Sur.
Ct. 1980), when making a Warms adjustment, removed § 691 Income in Respect of a
Decedent (IRD) items from the computation. This seems correct as IRD, although principal for fiduciary accounting purposes, is still subject to income taxes.
75. Carrico, Equitable Adjustments, supra note 2, at 19-7 to -8.
76. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
78. 80 Misc. 2d 374, 363 N.Y.S. 2d 265 (Sur. Ct. 1975).
79. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
80. Cornfeld, supra note 41, 1405. A 1981 survey by the American College of Probate Counsel, however, did not indicate any such common practice. See Carrico &
Bondurant, supra note 2, at 566.
81. RUPIA § 5 sets forth the distribution pattern for estate income. RUPIA §
5(b)(2) specifically charges taxes on estate income against the income before distribution.

Significantly, this section provides that the charge is for accrued taxes and is not limited
to taxes actually paid. This distinction is meaningful when other RUPIA sections are
examined. RUPIA § 13(a)(6) charges income of a trust with taxes levied against income,
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based on the RUPIA, the Holloway court discussed section
5(b)(2) of the Act.82 At a minimum, the RUPIA provides support, if only theoretical, for both Warms and Holloway
adjustments."3
Even if the RUPIA does not require equitable adjustments,
they are still consistent with the Act's provisions.8 4 Equitable
adjustments are not expressly prohibited by the RUPIA. States
that have adopted the Act may look to the law of equity or other
statutory law to determine if equitable adjustments are mandated. Finally, since RUPIA section 2 provides that the governing instrument can override all the Act's provisions, a testator is free to resolve all income and principal issues as he
desires.
Passage of the proposed 1986 Tax Reform Act may significantly affect the need for equitable adjustments in the future.
The House version of the Act completely rewrites the rules for
income taxation of estates and trusts,"' and eliminates the concept of DNI. Thus, if Congress enacts the House version, inequities caused by the DNI rules will not occur, and the need for the
corresponding equitable adjustments will disappear.8 6 The Senate Finance Committee version of the legislation, on the other
hand, does not repeal the concept of DNI, but does curtail the

but only for income taxes paid by a trustee. By contrast, the RUPIA § 5 charge against
estate income for income taxes is not conditioned on the payment of the income tax by
the executor. When a distribution of principle is treated as income, income taxes are due
on the estate income, but the distribution shifts the liability. The taxes are accrued in
the traditional sense of things.
If the estate does not pay its income tax liability because the distribution carried out
the income tax liability, the executor has excess money that does not belong to the income beneficiaries. RUPIA § 5 does not specify the beneficiary of the unallocated excess
money. Although there is no authority, it is logical that the excess money should reimburse the person who actually paid the taxes for the estate, i.e. the recipient of the DNI.
In In re Estate of Bixby, 140 Cal. App. 2d 326, 336, 295 P.2d 68, 74 (1956), the California
Court of Appeal stated, "On the basis of logic and as a matter of equity, the conclusion is
inescapable that income taxes assessed against the estate's income during the period reClearly, the regquired for administration should be charged against that income ....
ular income beneficiaries are not entitled to the money.
82. 68 Misc. at 365, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
83. Richard Covey believes that the RUPIA supports equitable adjustments. See R.
COVEY, supra note 2, at 52-57.
84. Dobris, Equitable Adjustments, supra note 2, at 129.
85. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1221, 131 CONG. REc. 12,681-85 (daily ed. Dec.
17, 1985).
86. The House version also repeals the § 643(d) election discussed supra note 68.
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tax savings achieved by using a trust's status as a separate
87
taxpayer.
The election to deduct estate administration expenses on
estate income tax returns survives both proposed revisions, and,
thus, the need for Warms adjustments will continue. Further,
since equitable adjustments are based on the law of equity, there
is no reason they cannot be expanded beyond the Warms and
Holloway adjustments. In fact, the House version provides for
several new tax elections that may be the basis for new equitable
adjustments. In addition, the House version of tax reform does
not affect existing estate and trust income tax rules for trusts
that were irrevocable before September 25, 1985, and estates of
decedents who died before September 25, 1985.88 As a result, existing equitable adjustment issues will continue for some time,
even if the House version becomes law.
In summary, equitable adjustments are not widely established by either case law or statutes.8 9 Nevertheless, there is little reason to doubt the equitable basis for such adjustments and
the potential for their use in all states except those that prohibit
them by statute.
III. TAx RAMIFICATIONS
Equitable adjustments raise potential income, gift, and estate tax issues, although only one reported case is directly on
point.9 0 Several commentators have made observations about the
possible tax consequences,9 1 but only two 92 have analyzed the issues in any depth.93 Nevertheless, existing precedent addressing

87. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 866-68 (1986).
88. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1211(c), 131 CONG. REC. 12,680 (daily ed. Dec.
17, 1985).
89. Since Warms there have been only 22 reported decisions.
90. Britenstool v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 711 (1966); see infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
91. See Moore, Conflicting Interests, supra note 2, 1915; Berall, supra note 2;
Blattmachr, Tax Effects, supra note 2; Carrico, Advanced Problems, supra note 2; Carrico, Equitable Adjustments, supra note 2.
92. See Blattmachr, Tax Effects, supra note 2, 1404; Carrico, Equitable Adjustments, supra note 2, at 19-17 to -19.
93. Several commentators have discussed the possibility that a simple trust may not
be a simple trust in a year in which it retains income to replenish principal as a part of
making a Warms adjustment. This, however, is of minor importance. Most Warms adjustments are made by estates that are complex trusts for income tax purposes, but are

Published by Scholar Commons, 1986

17

[Vol.
South Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1986], Art.
4
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAw REvIEw

600

37

analogous situations suggests how a court might rule if pre-

sented with the issues.
Tax issues might occur in at least three possible factual situations. First, an inheritance might be subject to a charge for an
equitable adjustment; second, a taxpayer might be the potential
recipient of an equitable adjustment; or third, a taxpayer might
be both the executor of the estate and a beneficiary. To consider
the tax issues, it is necessary to examine each of these circumstances separately. In addition, tax consequences may vary depending on whether the equitable adjustment is made by a
bookkeeping entry or by an actual distribution to the injured
party. Further, failure to make any adjustment, if an adjustment
is warranted, can also have tax consequences.
A.

The Beneficiary Due an Adjustment
1. Income Taxes

In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 94 the Supreme

Court declared that "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized," are income.95 Courts frequently use this test to determine if a taxpayer realizes income. In Fundamentalsof Federal
Income Taxation, 6 Professor Freeland and his coauthors provided a useful analytical test to determine gross income under
the Supreme Court's edict. They proposed that "gross income
includes the receipt of any financial benefit which is:
1. Not a mere return of capital, and
2. Not accompanied by a contemporaneously acknowledged obligation to repay, and
3. Not excluded by specific statutory provision."97
Under this test, the recipient of an equitable adjustment does
not realize income. Instead, the amount received is replacement
not subject to the throwback rules of I.R.C. §§ 665-68. In addition, the Service, in I.R.S.
Letter Ruling 8501084 (Jan. 17, 1985), has ruled that a simple trust has "outside" income
for purposes of the throwback rules if it receives an equitable adjustment. See Cornfeld,
supra note 41, at 14-22.
94. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
95. Id. at 431.
96. J. FREELAND, S.
TION

LIND & R. STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-

(5th ed. 1985).
97. Id. at 64.
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of principal that was lost as a result of the tax election by the
executor. With both the Warms and Holloway adjustments, the
beneficiary has lost principal (capital) that is replaced through
the equitable adjustment.
In addition, some commentators have suggested that the adjustment is not income because it is compensation for damages
or a debt of the estate." Although these commentators cite no
authority for their proposition, it is true that equitable adjustments are in the nature of compensation for damages.9 The tax
election has depleted principal by appropriating the benefit of a
tafx deduction. An equitable adjustment restores the principal.
Section 104 provides certain exclusions from income for personal injury damage recoveries, but equitable adjustments are
not among them. Fortunately, however, section 104 is not exclusive. Case law has also excepted other payments for damages
0 for example,
from gross income. In Boehm v. Commissioner,'"
the Second Circuit recognized that damages received for partial
injury to property, not in excess of a taxpayer's basis, are not
income.
More importantly, precedent holds that reimbursement of
tax costs is not income. In Clark v. Commissioner,'° ' a client recovered damages from his attorney for income taxes that the client paid because the attorney incorrectly filed the client's tax
return. The Board of Tax Appeals held that the recovery was in
the nature of a replacement of capital and, therefore, was not
income. The theory applied in Clark would also support the proposition that equitable adjustments are not income.
Existing precedent, thus, suggests that receipt of the adjustment should not be treated as income. This, however, is not the
end of the inquiry. The method by which the adjustment is
made can convert it to income.
The beneficiary of an adjustment that is accomplished by a
bookkeeping entry does not have income under the general rules
for income taxation of estates. 0 2 Instead of using a bookkeeping

98. Dobris, Equitable Adjustments, supra note 2, at 144; Moore, Conflicting Interests, supra note 2, 1915; Blattmachr, Tax Effects, supra note 2, T 1408, at 14-26.
99. Dobris, Equitable Adjustments, supra note 2, at 144.
100. 146 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.), af'd, 326 U. S. 287 (1945).
101. 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), acq., 1957-1 C.B. 4.
102. According to Richard Covey, professional executors do not treat these adjustments as income. See R. CovEy, supra note 2, at 55.
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entry to make an equitable adjustment, however, the executor
may elect to make an additional distribution to a beneficiary to
reimburse for the tax cost of the tax election. The Internal Revenue Service, in a 1985 letter ruling, held that an equitable adjustment distribution carried out DNI.103 In that ruling one trust
(Trust 1), according to its terms, made a distribution to another
trust (Trust 2). As a result of the distribution, Trust 2 received
DNI (and taxable income) from Trust 1, even though, for fiduciary accounting purposes, the distribution was characterized as
principal. In a subsequent tax year, the trustee made a Holloway
adjustment. Trust 1 distributed to Trust 2 the amount necessary
to replenish the principal of Trust 2 for the income tax consequence of the distribution in the prior year. The Service ruled
that the distribution in the second year represented taxable income to Trust 2 since the amount of the distribution was less
than the DNI of Trust I for the tax year."'
This letter ruling seems correct. Trust 2 received the second
distribution in its capacity as a beneficiary of Trust 1.105 While it
is arguable that the status of Trust 2 is that of a creditor and,
therefore, the DNI rules are inapplicable, no statute or case supports that proposition.10 6 Under Subchapter J DNI rules, a distribution to a beneficiary carries out DNI and is taxable income.
It is noteworthy, however, that the Service did not rule that the
equitable adjustment was income per se.
The Service's DNI interpretation also has precedential support. In several revenue rulings, the Service has held that funding a pecuniary formula marital deduction in kind with appreciated assets triggers gain.10 7 The theory underlying the rulings is
103. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8501011 (Jan. 17, 1985).
104. Letter Ruling 8501011 was clarified by a second ruling issued on the same day.
In I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8501084 (Jan. 17, 1985), the Service held that the accumulated
income that results from the equitable adjustment, after reduction for the income taxes
in year two, represents undistributable net income. This means that when the trust ultimately terminates, the remaindermen will receive income subject to the throwback rules.
105. Blattmachr, Tax Effects, supra note 2, 1408, at 14-26, discusses whether the
receipt of the equitable adjustment is in the capacity of a creditor or a beneficiary. That
article, which was published prior to I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8501011, speculated that the
distribution of an equitable adjustment carries out DNL
106. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938).
107. Rev. Rul. 56-270, 1956-1 C. B. 270; Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 C.B. 286. But cf.
Rev. Rul. 55-117, 1955-1 C.B. 230 (partial distribution to a residuary trust does not trigger income); Rev. Rul. 64-101, 1964-1 C.B. 77 (distribution of dower rights does not trigger income); Rev. Rul. 71-167, 1971-1 C.B. 163 (distribution of income due on delayed
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that the amount due the beneficiary is a debt of the estate.
When the estate satisfies its obligation by using appreciated
property, a taxable disposition occurs.105
Despite the classification of a pecuniary formula marital bequest as a debt, distributions by an estate to the surviving
spouse still carry out DNI. The specific bequest exception in section 663(a) is inapplicable. Treasury Regulation section 1.663(a)1(b) requires that the amount of a marital bequest be identified
as of the date of death to avoid the DNI rules. The amount of a
formula marital bequest, however, cannot be determined until
assets of the estate are appraised and the executor makes various tax elections. Similarly, an equitable adjustment is not determinable at the date of death; an adjustment does not arise
until after the executor makes a tax election, and the amount of
the adjustment depends on a number of factors. For these reasons, application of the DNI theory to equitable adjustment distributions seems correct even if the debt theory applies.109
2. Gift Taxes
A beneficiary due an equitable adjustment may have a gift
tax liability if the right to receive the adjustment is not asdower rights does carry out DNI). In Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir.
1940), the Second Circuit determined that the satisfaction of a specific pecuniary bequest in kind with appreciated assets causes recognition of gain. See also Suisman v.
Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), aff'd, 83 F.2d 1019 (2d dir. 1936), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 573 (1936).
108. The Supreme Court embraced this concept in a different context. See United
States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 854 (1962).
109. The letter ruling did not consider the possibility that the second distribution is
the basis for another equitable adjustment since it replaces principal, but is income for
tax purposes. Notwithstanding the feeling that equitable adjustments will never end, if
the first adjustment is mandated, then the second may be as well. See Cornfeld, supra
note 41, at 14-22.
One possible tactic by the executor may help avoid the circular problem. If the executor anticipates an adjustment at the time of the first distribution, an additional distribution at that time to reimburse for estimated income taxes will eliminate the need for
the second distribution and the additional adjustments. If all the estate's DNI is already
distributed, a distribution of the exact dollar amount of the equitable adjustment will
suffice. If, however, the first distribution does not carry out all the estate's DNI, a more
complicated adjustment is needed. The amount of the adjustment needs to be increased
to the point that the amount of the adjustment, after income taxes, is sufficient to replace the income taxes incurred on the total distribution. This complicated mathematical
computation might lead an executor to forgo this "easy method" and deal with the decreasing circle of adjustments or not adjust at all.
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serted.' 10 The exception to the discharge of indebtedness income
problem, discussed below, is donative intent. Although this rule
is helpful to the estate or the beneficiary that owes an adjustment, it causes a gift tax problem for the beneficiary who is due
an adjustment.
The potential recipient of an equitable adjustment who intentionally forgoes an adjustment may be making a taxable
transfer. Section 2511 imposes a gift tax on all transfers of property that are made for less than full and adequate consideration."' For example, gift taxes apply to indebtedness that is inhas
directly forgiven 12 or r which the statute of limitations
113
expired, whether or not the creditor intended the lapse.
In Revenue Ruling 84-105,"4 the Service ruled that a widow
who did not object to the underfunding of a marital trust made
a gift to the estate's residuary beneficiary. In that ruling the estate was allowed an estate tax marital deduction of 200x dollars.
When the executor completed the funding of the marital bequest, the amount transferred to the surviving spouse's trust was
160x dollars, or 40x dollars less than the amount allowed as a
marital deduction in the federal estate tax proceedings. The
widow did not assert her right to have her marital bequest fully
funded when a local probate court approved the final accounting
that disclosed the underfunding. The Service ruled that the
widow, by failing to insist on full funding of the trust, made a
taxable gift to the decedent's son, the residuary beneficiary. By
analogy, the failure to
assert a right to an equitable adjustment
115
is a taxable transfer.

110. Rev. Rul. 84-105, 1984-2 C.B. 197; Cornfeld, supra note 41, at 14-22.
111. There is no question that the gift, if it occurs, is to the beneficiaries and not to

the estate. In Helvering v. Hutchins, 312 U.S. 393 (1941), the Supreme Court declared,
"One does not speak of making a gift to a trust rather than to ...

its beneficiaries." Id.

at 396.
112. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1; W. H. Myers v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. 975 (1968).
113. Estate of Lang v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'g 64 T.C. 404

(1975); Rev. Rul. 81-264, 1981-2 C.B. 185.
114. 1984-2 C.B. 197.
115. In the alternative, it is possible that a gift to the executor, individually, may
occur if the beneficiary does not object to the executer's failure to make the adjustment
by attempting to have court surcharge him. It may be too late to make the other benefi-

ciaries give up the adjustment, when the beneficiary discovers that the executor has not
made the equitable adjustment. In this case, the gift may be to the executor. The rela-

tionship of the beneficiary due the adjustment to the executor and the estate's beneficiaries who owe the adjustment is likely to be determinative of who receives the gift. Any
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Further, Treasury Regulation section 25.2514-1(b)(1) provides that a power to consent to a fiduciary's accounting "is not
a power of appointment if the right of assent does not consist of
any power or right to enlarge or shift the beneficial interest of
any beneficiary therein." The negative implication of this regulation is that the right to object to an accounting that will shift
beneficial interest is a power of appointment and that a beneficiary who has a right to an equitable adjustment has such a
power. Since the expiration of a power of appointment results in
a gift by the power holder, the beneficiary who does not assert
his right to an equitable adjustment may incur a gift tax
liability.
Even a beneficiary who is unaware of the right to an adjustment can still be liable for gift taxes; lack of knowledge or donative intent does not negate a gift. In Commissioner v.
Wemyss," 6 the Supreme Court declared that donative intent, in
the conventional sense, is not required to make a gift. 117 Subsequently, in Estate of James C. Freeman v. Commissioner,"5 the
Tax Court ruled that the decedent held a taxable general power
of appointment over a trust created by his parents, even though
he never saw the trust agreement and was unaware of the power
of appointment. The court included the value of the trust in the
decedent's gross estate pursuant to section 2041, despite his lack
of knowledge. Similarly, other cases have held that a decedent's
mental incompetence is irrelevant to the operation of section

gift to the executor is a gift to him individually, not in his fiduciary capacity. This is so
because he personally, and not the estate, is liable for a surcharge. Since it is a factual
question of whether the other beneficiaries must give up assets or the executor must
make up the loss, determining who is the recipient of the gift is made on a case by case
basis.
An additional issue is whether the "deemed gift" qualifies for the present interest
annual exclusion. While it is possible that a gift in this context is a present interest,
depending on the particular facts, gifts in trust are generally gifts of future interests. See
I.R.C. § 2503(b). If the adjustment occurs inside an estate or a trust, it is likely to be a
future interest and not qualifying for the $10,000 annual exclusion.
The annual exclusion question may have a different answer if the gift is to the executor. Since a surcharge for failing to make the adjustment is extracted from the executor
individually and not the estate, it represents a present benefit to the executor. This gift
should pass the present interest test and qualify for the $10,000 annual exclusion.
116. 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
117. Id. at 306.
118. 67 T.C. 202 (1976).
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2041.""

No cases have considered the gift tax ramifications when a
taxpayer is unaware of an expiring power of appointment. There
is no basis, however, to conclude that gift tax section 2514 would
yield a different result from estate tax section 2041, since gift
tax and estate tax provisions are read in pari materia.120 As the
Tax Court stated in Freeman, "The existence of the power of
appointment brings it within the ambit of section 2041(a) (2). ' '121

3. Estate Taxes
An equitable adjustment due a beneficiary at the time of
death affects the size of his gross estate. Section 2033 includes in
a decedent's gross estate all assets in which the decedent has a
right at the time of death. 122 Treasury Regulation section

20.2033-1 provides that a gross estate includes all property beneficially owned by a decedent. It seems clear, then, that if a decedent dies in a state where equitable adjustments are well established, section 2033 applies, and the right to an equitable
adjustment is an asset of the decedent's estate. 123 If, however,
the decedent dies in a state that does not recognize equitable
adjustments, the situation is less clear. Since he may not have a
"right" to the adjustment at death, the adjustment may not be
an asset of the estate.
Valuation of the right to an adjustment is, of course, not

119. Boeving v. United States, 650 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1981); Estate of Alperstein v.
Commissioner, 613 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1979); Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States, 597 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1979). But see Williams v. United States, 634 F.2d 894 (5th
Cir. 1981).
120. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945).
121. 67 T.C. 202, 209 (1976).
122. Estate of Bogley v. United States, 514 F.2d 1027 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Rev. Rul 75145, 1975-1 C.B. 298.
123. If the prior estate has not yet been distributed, the asset included in the new
decedent's estate is an interest in the prior estate. See Estate of Hanch v. Commissioner,
19 T.C. 65 (1952). The equitable adjustment is one of the assets due the new decedent
from the first estate. An appraiser should consider the value of the equitable adjustment
when appraising the value of an interest in the prior estate. If the new decedent has
received all that is due from the prior estate except the equitable adjustment, a valuation
of the equitable adjustment should be made separately and included in the decedent's

gross estate as an interest in the prior estate. Presumably, it would be reported on
Schedule F of IRS Form 706 as miscellaneous property as is the interest from the prior
estate,
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easy, but the right must, nevertheless, be valued. An estate may
include any number of assets, such as tort claims, that are difficult to appraise; yet these assets have been and are required to
be valued. 1 24 Treasury Regulation section 20.2031-1 provides
that all property of a decedent's gross estate be appraised at its
fair market value, and the right to an equitable adjustment is no
12 5
exception.
The situation is different, however, when a potential equitable adjustment is in the discretion of an executor and, at the
time of the beneficiary's death, the executor has not yet indicated how he will exercise his discretion. Section 2033 includes
in the gross estate only those assets in which the decedent has a
right. 126 If the executor has discretion to make the adjustment,
no such right exists, and the value of the equitable adjustment
should not be included in the decedent's gross estate.
Adjustment Owed

B.

The taxpayer who benefits from a tax election made by an
executor may "owe" an equitable adjustment. More accurately, a
portion of his or her inheritance may be subject to a charge for
the adverse tax consequences of the tax election. Potential income and estate tax issues exist for this beneficiary.
1.

Income Taxes

The beneficiary whose inheritance may be reduced by an
equitable adjustment does not appear to have gross income if
the adjustment is made. 127 On the other hand, an income tax
consequence may arise if the adjustment is not made. It depends
on whether the potential adjustment is the beneficiary's debt or
a debt of the estate or a debt at all. It is not clear whether it is

124. The Supreme Court, in Burnett'v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), held that for
income tax purposes, difficult to value assets are not always valued. When appropriate,
valuation is deferred. For estate tax purposes, however, the valuation issue must be resolved. Id. at 413.
125. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1.
126. Estate of Bogley v. United States. 514 F.2d 1027 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
127. One commentator has suggested that the beneficiary who owed the adjustment
is deemed to have received a distribution and DNI since his or her liability was discharged. See Cornfeld, supra note 41, at 14-22.
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the estate or the beneficiary's inheritance that owes the equitable adjustment. From the estate's point of view, an equitable adjustment merely shifts assets from one beneficiary to another.
Nevertheless, from the beneficiary's point of view, it is not truly
his debt either. It represents a potential charge against his inheritance, as is true of all debts of an estate.
Under the Glenshaw Glass and Freeland tests, set out
above, 28 the failure to make an adjustment appears to produce
an income tax consequence for the estate beneficiary who owes
the adjustment; he receives additional assets that are not a return of capital and are not accompanied by the execution of a
note of repayment. Similar windfalls, such as punitive damages
and treasure trove, are taxable income.12 9 Likewise, public utilities realize income when security deposits are no longer refundable to former customers because the statute of limitations has
30
expired.1
Section 102, which excludes gifts and inheritances from income, is the only statutory exclusion that might exempt from
income an equitable adjustment that was not ns-'. The additional amount received by a beneficiary when m. equitable adjustment is not made, however, is certainly not an inheritance
since it results from the executor's inaction rather than from the
decedent's death. 3 " As discussed above, failure to make an equitable adjustment may be a gift by the persons entitled to it if
they fail to assert their right. If the failure to make an equitable
adjustment results from donative intent, section 102 eliminates
any income tax consequences for the beneficiary who owes the
adjustment.
In states such as New York, where equitable adjustments
are required by statute, the failure to make an adjustment has

128. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
129. The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955),
determined that punitive damages are income. At one time the Service included punitive

damages for personal injuries under the § 104(a)(2) exclusion from income. See Rev. Rul
75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47. Recently, however, the Service reversed its position. See Rev. Rul.

84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) declares that treasure trove is income. See also Cesarini v.

United States, 296 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ohio 1969), aff'd per curiam, 428 F.2d 812 (6th Cir.
1970).
130. Boston Consol. Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1942). See also

Rev. Rul. 75-300, 1975-2 C.B. 23.
131. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938).
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more certain income tax consequences, despite the absence of
any income tax cases on point. The potential adjustment,
though not a debt in the conventional sense, represents a liability. Therefore, the benefit received from the failure to make an
adjustment is similar to a discharge of indebtedness. 32 In Estate
3 an estate realized
of Emelil Bankhead v. Commissioner,'"
income when a debt it owed was discharged by the expiration of
the statute of limitations. The decedent and her family owned
249 of 250 outstanding shares in a corporation. At the time of
her death, Mrs. Bankhead owed the corporation approximately
$45,000, but the corporation did not file a claim against her estate within the statutory period for creditor's claims. According
to the Tax Court, the failure to file a timely claim triggered discharge of indebtedness income. The court declared, "It is this
undeniable economic benefit that creates income for purposes of
the Internal Revenue Code under circumstances such as those
3 4
here present.'1
The Tax Court reaffirmed its position in Carl T. Miller
Trust v. Commissioner,'3 5 which was factually similar to Bankhead. In Carl T. Miller Trust, the court declared that a taxpayer
realizes discharge of indebtedness income if assets are freed
from a debt, whether secured or unsecured. 3 6 Further, it makes
no difference that the taxpayer's liability on a debt is not personal. 3 7 By analogy, then, failure of an executor to make an equitable adjustment may cause an income tax consequence.
Under the Glenshaw Glass test for income, the crucial question is whether any accession of wealth has occurred. The value
of the estate remains the same. Assets stay in one account rather
than moving from one account to another if the adjustment is
made. In Carl T. Miller Trust the taxpayer argued that since
the debtor estate owned a large portion of the creditor corporation, the debt was an asset of the corporation and the failure to
file a claim was meaningless. If the debt was discharged, the increase in the value of the estate was offset by the decreased

132. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931); I.R.C. § 61(a)(12).

133. 60 T.C. 535 (1973). See also Carl T. Miller Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 191
(1981).
134. 60 T.C. 535, 540 (1973).
135. 76 T.C. 191 (1981).
136. Id. at 195.
137. Rev. Rul. 82-202, 1982-2 C.B. 35.
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value of the corporation. Despite the appeal of the argument,
the Tax Court rejected it. The court determined that a change
in the corporation's value might be an estate tax valuation issue,
but it did not change the fact the estate had been relieved from
138
a liability.
If failure to make an adjustment is a discharge of indebtedness, the question remains whether the income is realized by the
decedent's estate or by the beneficiary whose inheritance owes
the adjustment. In both Bankhead and Miller, the estates and
not the beneficiaries realized the income, although beneficiaries
of the estate ultimately received the benefit of the creditor's failure to file a claim. In each case the estate was liable for the debt,
and, thus, when the statute of limitations expired, it was the estate that was discharged from the liability. By analogy, it is the
estate, or more accurately, the assets in the possession of the
executor, that owes an equitable adjustment. Thus, it seems that
the estate, not the beneficiary, realizes income. 139
In Helvering v. American Dental Co., 140 the Supreme Court
established a donative intent exception to the discharge of indebtedness rule. If the gratuitous exception applies, no discharge
of indebtedness income occurs; instead, as discussed above, the
141
beneficiary due the adjustment has a gift tax problem.
In states that have no authority for equitable adjustments,
the failure to make an adjustment may not have any income tax
consequence. The application of the discharge of indebtedness
income theory should apply only if the beneficiary has a right to
the adjustment. Unless a legally enforceable liability exists,
there is no debt to discharge.1 42 Thus, the income tax conse-

138. In Miller the estate did not own 100% of the corporation. While this helped
negate the taxpayer's argument, the Tax Court rejected it as a determining factor. 76
T.C. 191, 200 (1981).
139. In the alternative, it is arguable that the beneficiaries who beneficially own the
assets of the estate relieved from making the equitable adjustment have an accession to
wealth and, thus, realize the discharge of indebtedness income. Even under this theory,
however, the estate may still be taxed on the income since it is the taxable entity in
possession of the assets at the time of the discharge. Other types of income generated
from assets beneficially owned by the estate's beneficiaries are taxed to the estate. Although no authority exists for or against the position, taxing the estate seems the more
logical conclusion and is consistent with the conduit theory of estate income taxation.
140. 318 U. S. 322 (1943).
141. See supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
142. I.R.C. § 108 defines "indebtedness" as "an obligation, absolute and not
contingent."
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quence depends on whether the beneficiary has a "right" to the
adjustment, and as indicated above, this issue is determined by
state law.
Whether a right to an adjustment exists in a particular state
may also depend on which type of adjustment is potentially due.
The Warms adjustment is well established by court decision and
by statute. 143 The Holloway adjustment, on the other hand, is
supported by only two cases, although it may be in common
practice. The other potential adjustments are without either judicial or statutory basis. To the extent that the lack of authority
means that the equitable adjustments are not required, there
may be no right to the adjustments and, therefore, no income
tax consequences for failing to make them.
Finally, no income tax consequence should result from the
failure to make an adjustment when the governing document
grants the executor discretion to make the adjustment and state
law does not override that discretion.4 The cancellation of indebtedness problem should apply only if there is an unasserted
right to an adjustment, and no such right exists when the power
to make the adjustment is in the executor's discretion.
2. Estate Taxes
The gross estate of a beneficiary who dies owing an adjustment should be smaller than if no adjustment were owed. More
accurately, if the inheritance due from the prior estate is yet to
be reduced by an equitable adjustment at the time of the new
decedent's death, the value of the inheritance due should be reduced by the amount of the potential adjustment.
The new decedent's gross estate includes the inheritance yet
to come from the earlier estate at its fair market value, determined at the time of the new decedent's death. If an adjustment
is owed, the appraised value of the inheritance is reduced by the

143. Declining to make an adjustment because of the lack of cases and statutes is
not wise. Several commentators believe that the paucity of cases results from the wide
acceptance and common use of this adjustment. A 1981 survey of the American College
of Probate Counsel does not support the commentators' theory. See Carrico &
Bondurant, supra note 2, at 605-28. Nevertheless, caution is in order.
144. See In re Estate of Backus, 106 Misc. 2d 463, 434 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sur. Ct. 1980);
In re Estate of Coe, 80 Misc. 2d 374, 363 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sur. Ct. 1975); In re Estate of Le
Compte, 52 Misc. 2d 549, 276 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sur. Ct. 1966).
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amount of the adjustment. 145 The equitable adjustment is not a
debt of the new decedent's estate. 4 6 The speculative nature of
the equitable adjustment does not alter this result, 147 although it
may affect valuation.
In states that do not recognize equitable adjustments, the
estate tax issue is not clear, but the valuation approach seems
appropriate. The decedent is due an inheritance from the prior
estate. When valuing that interest, the probability of giving up
an equitable adjustment should48 be reflected in the appraised
value of the inherited interest.

Finally, there should be no estate tax significance when the
executor of the first estate has the discretion to make the adjustment, but, as of the time of the beneficiary's death, has not decided how he will exercise his discretion. A subsequent exercise
of discretion by the executor to make an adjustment will not affect the value of the inheritance since events that occur after the
death of the new decedent do not change the value. In Estate of
Wood v. Commissioner, 49 for example, the Tax Court did not
decrease the value of an inheritance due for income taxes of the
first estate that accrued after the second decedent's death.
C. The Fiduciary-Decedent
The beneficiary who is also the executor of the estate faces
additional income, gift, and estate tax issues. Depending on the
amount of discretion granted the executor by the governing instrument, significant tax issues may exist.
1. Income Taxes
In addition to the income tax problems described above, the
beneficiary who is also the executor has yet another problem.
145. Bahr v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1941).
146. Id.
147. Pending tort claims are estate tax deductions. See Estate of Nilson v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. 708 (1972). Other speculative assets, such as contingent remainder in-

terests, are estate assets.
148. For a discussion of the potential for equitable adjustments in states where equitable adjustments are not currently made, see supra notes 74-89 and accompanying
text.
149. 54 T.C. 1180 (1970). Wood was a beneficiary of an estate at the time of his

death. After his death the first estate sold assets and incurred an income tax.
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The power to make an equitable adjustment may cause the executor to be taxed on estate income even if the power is not exercised. Although several theories can be advanced to support this
proposition, 50 it remains entirely theoretical. If this problem
does exist, however, it can be avoided in either of two ways: the
decedent could name a coexecutor with the beneficiary, or he
could restrict or prohibit the power to make an equitable adjustment. Either method should prove effective.
2.

Gift Taxes

The executor of an estate who has the discretion to make an
equitable adjustment has the ability to shift estate income from
one beneficiary to another. This power presents no problem for
an executor who is not a beneficiary of the estate. If, however,
the executor is a beneficiary, this power may be a taxable general power of appointment within the meaning of section 2514.
This section defines a general power of appointment as "a power
which is exercisable in favor of the individual possessing the
power . . ., his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his
estate."1 5 '
Although the power to make an equitable adjustment is not
called a power of appointment, the gift tax regulations make it

150. I.R.C. § 678 taxes income to anyone who has the power to vest income or
corpus of a trust in himself. For § 678 to apply, the power must be exercisable solely by
the beneficiary, which means that a cofiduciary will prevent a beneficiary from being
taxed on the income that can be shifted by an equitable adjustment.
It is questionable whether § 678 applies to an estate since no cases have applied it.
The statute specifically refers to trusts, and in most situations, an estate is not likely to
be subject to the § 678 rules. Treas. Reg. § 1.678(a)-1(a) refers to "testamentary or inter
vivos" trusts.
If § 678 applies to a beneficiary-executor, two cases provide that § 678 is not applicable where the prohibited power is subject to an external standard. See Funk v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1950), rev'g 14 T.C. 198 (1950), after remand by 163
F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1947), rev'g 7 T.C. 890 (1946); United States v. Smither 205 F.2d 518
(5th Cir. 1953), af'g 108 F. Supp. 772 (S.D. Tex. 1952).
Even if § 678 does not apply, the theory of Mallinckrodt v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d
1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871 (1945), might still cause an executor to be taxed
on estate income. Section 678 is the statutory adoption of the Mallinckrodt principle.
The Eighth Circuit's decision relied on general theories of taxation. Nevertheless, Estate
of Harwood v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 750 (1942), determined that a sole executor and
sole beneficiary of an estate was not taxed on undistributed estate income. It is noteworthy that Harwood preceded Mallinckrodt.
151. I.R.C. § 2514(c). Cf. estate tax § 2041.
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clear that nomenclature is not determinative for identifying
powers of appointment. 15 2 It is equally clear that local law is not
controlling for gift tax purposes.153 Once the label attached to
the power is disregarded, it is apparent that the power to make
an equitable adjustment has the potential to be a taxable power
of appointment.
In example 1 above,1 54 the residuary trust is potentially due
$90,000 from the income account. The executor, therefore, has
the power to shift $90,000 away from the decedent's daughter
and to the trust. If the son is the executor, he has the power to
appoint $90,000 to the trust of which he is the remainderman
and might, therefore, hold a general power of appointment.
It is possible, however, that an executor's power to make an
equitable adjustment is not a power of appointment. The gift
tax and estate tax regulations both provide that a power to allocate receipts between income and principal held in a fiduciary
capacity "whereby the holder has no power to enlarge or shift
any of the beneficial interests therein except as an incidental
consequence of the discharge of such fiduciary duties is not a
power of appointment."' 15 The question is whether this language
means that a power to make an equitable adjustment is not a
general power of appointment and provides a safe harbor from
the gift tax.
In states that require equitable adjustments, the power is
probably within the regulation's safe harbor. Since the executor
is required to make the equitable adjustment, he has a duty, not
a "power," to enlarge or shift beneficial interests. The regulation
exception, however, limits the exception to situations when the
power to shift assets among beneficiaries is an"incidental consequence of the discharge of such fiduciary duties." Unfortunately,
neither the regulations nor any judicial or administrative pro15
It
nouncements discuss the meaning of the quoted phrase.
should be noted, however, that all allocations of principal and
income cause real shifts among beneficiaries. The power to make

152. Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-1(b)(1).
153. Id.
154. See supra subpart II(B).
155. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2514-1(b)(1), 20.2041-1(b)(1).
156. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8332007 (Aug. 3, 1983) mentions the regulation, but does
not analyze the meaning of the language.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss4/4

32

1986]

Boyle: TaxEQUITABLE
Consequences
of Equitable Adjustments
ADJUSTMENTS

an equitable adjustment is no greater than the normal power to
allocate receipts between principal and income held by a fiduciary. As a result, the power to make an equitable adjustment
should not be a general power of appointment.
In states that have neither statutory nor judicial authority
for equitable adjustments, the power to make an equitable adjustment is still probably not a general power of appointment. A
power to make an equitable adjustment, whether based on the
law of equity or, possibly, on the Revised Uniform Principal and
Income Act, is a power exercisable by a fiduciary in a fiduciary
capacity. If the governing instrument grants discretion, it is still
exercisable in a fiduciary capacity. The regulation does not specify that the power to allocate must be derived from any particular source; it merely restricts the safe harbor to powers exercisable in a fiduciary capacity. A power to make an equitable
adjustment falls within that category.
On the other hand, a broad power in a will to make equitable adjustments, not limited to exercise in a fiduciary capacity,
is outside the regulation's safe harbor. Such a broad grant of
power can occur when a will gives the executor absolute discretion to make equitable adjustments and state law does not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.5 In this situation, the
power to make an equitable adjustment may be a taxable power
of appointment.
What course of action might avoid the gift tax? First, the
testator could restrict the power by drafting, as discussed below. 158 Second, the testator could name two beneficiaries as coexecutors. For instance, in example 1 the daughter could be
named coexecutrix, along with the son. A power exercisable only
159
with the consent of an adverse party is not a taxable power.
Since the power would affect the decedent's daughter, she would
be an adverse party, and the power would not be taxable. 6 0
In summary, as long as the power to make an equitable adjustment is exercisable by the executor in a fiduciary capacity
and not in his absolute discretion, it should not be a general

157.
347 P.2d
158.
159.
160.

3 A. Scorr, supra note 15, § 187. See also Rowe v. Rowe, 219 Or. 599, 604-05,
968, 971 (1959).
See infra part IV.
I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(c)(ii).
Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(c)(2).
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power of appointment within the meaning of section 2514. Caution should be exercised, however, since this issue is not well defined. At a minimum, wills that permit discretionary equitable
adjustments should specifically limit the power to make an equitable adjustment so that it is only exercisable in a fiduciary capacity. It would also strengthen the executor's argument if the
power is incidental to the power to allocate receipts between income and principal. Specific drafting suggestions are discussed
in part IV of this Article.
3. Estate Taxes
Finally, what if the decedent was an executor who died possessing the power to make an equitable adjustment in his own
favor? The preceding discussion has argued that the power to
make an equitable adjustment is not a general power of appointment. If this analysis is incorrect, however, then the decedentexecutor holds a general power of appointment at the time of
death, and the value of the potential adjustment is included in
the new decedent's gross estate."6 '
A power to make an equitable adjustment that lapses during the executor's lifetime may also cause an estate tax problem
if it was a general power of appointment. Section 2041 includes
in a decedent's estate the value of property that was subject to a
general power of appointment that has lapsed if the decedent
62
retains certain interests in the property.
D. Marital Deduction Issues
The marital deduction is the most popular tax savings technique in estate planning. Virtually every wills form book focuses
on the marital deduction and the estate tax advantages it provides. Good draftsmen are very careful to avoid all potential
problems related to marital deductions 163 and should, therefore,
consider the possible effect of an equitable adjustment on the
marital deduction.
161.
that the
162.
163.

If the second death occurs within nine months of the first death, it is possible
executor of the second estate could disclaim the power to adjust.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(d).
See Evans, supra note 61. See also R. WiLKiNs, DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUST
AGREEMENTS: A SYsTEMs APPROACH,
9.30W, 13.67W, at 337, 414 (2d ed. 1980).
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In example 3 above, 6 the election to deduct estate administration expenses on the income tax returns causes the marital
deduction to increase and the residuary to decrease. The few
cases that have considered this issue have not required an equitable adjustment. 1 65 These cases, however, were decided in only
two states, and no appellate court has yet addressed the issue.
Such limited precedent is hardly determinative of the issue.
Few cases have provided any discussion of the mechanics of
equitable adjustments. The courts that have discussed this issue
have concluded that the adjustment is accomplished by shifting
estate income, but not estate principal, to compensate the injured party. In example 3, however, the income tax savings
achieved by the section 642(g) election are not sufficient to make
the residuary beneficiary whole. 6 Any court that decides to
make an adjustment under these circumstances has two choices:
it can give additional estate income to the residuary, or it can
reduce the principal amount of the marital deduction.'
If the executor reduces the principal of the marital bequest,
the amount of the estate tax marital deduction is likely to be
affected. In Estate of Britenstool v. Commissioner,168 an election

to deduct estate adminstration expenses against income reduced
a residuary charitable bequest. The estate, however, made an equitable adjustment. The Tax Court determined the estate's
charitable deduction by considering what the charity received
after the adjustment, and the IRS has acquiesced in this result.119 By analogy, whatever passes to the surviving spouse after
an equitable adjustment qualifies for the marital deduction. In
example 3, if the widow's trust must give up some of the marital

164. See supra subpart II(D).
165. See In re Veith's Estate, 26 Fla. Supp. 145 (Cir. Ct. 1965); In re Estate of
McTarnahan, 27 Misc. 2d 13, 202 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sur. Ct. 1960); In re Estate of Inman, 22
Misc. 2d 573, 196 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sur. Ct. 1959).
166. If the marital bequest is outright instead of in trust, the residuary will already
be entitled to all estate income and the income tax savings generated by the deduction.
Since, however, the income tax savings will not totally replace the principal lost as a
result of the tax election, an equitable adjustment must infringe on the marital share if
the residuary is to be made whole.
167. A third choice for the executor is to partially compensate the residuary
beneficiaries.
168. 46 T.C. 711 (1966).
169. Rev. Rul. 78-445, 1978-2 C.B. 242; I.R.S. Letter Rulings 7811022 (Mar. 17,
1978), 8016003 (Apr. 30, 1980).
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share to the children, the estate tax marital deduction is reduced
and will not be large enough to eliminate all federal estate taxes.
Any attempt to use additional estate income to make the
residuary whole may precipitate another problem. Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-4(a) provides that the value of the
marital deduction allowable for estate tax purposes must take
into account "the effect of any material limitations upon her
right to income from the property." Unfortunately, no cases or
rulings explain the meaning of this regulation. 17 0 Treasury Regu-

lation section 20.2056(b)-5(f)(9) provides, however, that the marital deduction is not lost altogether if the surviving spouse does
not receive any estate income.171 Nevertheless, the amount of
the marital deduction may be reduced. 17 2 Treasury Regulation
section 20.2056(b)-5(f)(9) makes a specific reference to Treasury
Regulation section 20.2056(b)-4 when the right to income from
the trust is expressly postponed. Although the negative implication of the reference is that unless the income is expressly postponed, the valuation question does not arise, Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-4 contains no such limitation on its
application. Whether this presents a problem is unknown. 173 One
commentator has suggested that a problem does arise when the
surviving spouse has a right to the income under state law, but
exercise of the discretion to make an equitable adjustment takes
some of it away from the spouse. 74
Distributions of principal that are treated as income pose a
different threat to the marital deduction. When all or a portion
of the marital bequest is income because of the DNI rules, the
valuation issue of Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-4 must
be considered. In example 2 the amount received by the widow
is not worth $500,000 to her since she will lose a portion of it to
income taxes. The estate tax marital deduction should not be
170. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8033103 (Aug. 3, 1983) discusses the application of the
regulation when a decedent's will provides 3.5% annual income on the marital share
instead of the amount of income prescribed by state law.
171. See Rev. Rul. 77-346, 1977-2 C.B. 340.
172. For additional discussion, see Adams, Questions and Answers on Estate Planning and Administration, 125 T& & EsT. 50, 54 (January 1986).
173. One commentator believes that Trees. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4 should not apply if
state law imposes the restriction. See R. CovEy, supra note 2, at 72. Nevertheless, the
same commentator suggests a precautionary drafting solution to ensure that the marital
deduction is not jeopardized. Id. at 73-74.
174. See Blattmachr, Tax Effects, supra note 2.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss4/4

36

19861

Boyle: TaxEQUITABLE
Consequences
of Equitable Adjustments
ADJUSTMENTS

affected if a gift results when the right to an adjustment is not
asserted. If, however, the widow cannot force the adjustment
and the executor does not make it, then, arguably, the marital
deduction is affected, as it is underfunded. From a pure economic analysis, the amount allowable as a marital deduction is
not being transferred to the widow, and the remainder of the
estate is unjustly benefiting at the expense of the surviving
spouse. 17 51
Although the logic of this argument seems clear, there is
some precedent against it. In Estate of Robinson v. Commis1 76 the Tax Court held
sioner,
that, for estate tax purposes, an
item of income in respect of a decedent (IRD) was valued without reduction for the potential income tax due. In a letter ruling
the Service ruled that the potential income taxes on items of
IRD are ignored for marital deduction funding purposes as well.
The Service conceded that reducing the value of items of IRD
for potential income taxes is exceedingly complex, although not
impossible.'17
Items of IRD are analogous to distributions of principal that
are treated as income for tax purposes. Both are principal for
fiduciary accounting purposes, although both are subject to income taxes when received. After income taxes are paid, the recipient no longer has what was distributed. Nevertheless, a distribution of principal that is treated as income may be
distinguished from IRD. In Robinson the Tax Court determined
that Congress enacted section 691(c) to provide relief from an
obvious inequity. This subsection gives an income tax deduction
for the estate taxes attributable to the item of IRD. In the case
of the distribution of principal treated as income, however, the
Internal Revenue Code provides no relief. In addition, the speculative nature of estimating the income tax on an item of IRD
does not exist for the distribution of principal that is treated as
income. When this type of distribution occurs, it is possible to
determine with precision the tax savings to the estate and the

175. Although not precedent for the current situation, draftsmen should be aware
that in the 1960s, when estate administrators were manipulating the marital deduction
by using estate tax values for funding purposes, the Internal Revenue Service came down
hard on the technique. See Rev. Proc. 64-19, 1962-1 C.B. 682.
176. 69 T.C. 222 (1977).
177. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 7827008 (July 11, 1978).
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tax cost to the beneficiary.
Since the estate tax issue is in many ways a valuation question, the general valuation test of a willing buyer-willing seller
should be considered. Would someone pay the surviving spouse
$500,000 for the right to $500,000?17 8 Ignoring the time value of

money, the answer is yes. For the widow, however, the situation
is different. No one would pay $500,000 to assume her place as a
beneficiary. The value of what the widow receives, when it includes DNI, is not worth $500,000. It is worth $500,000 only if it
is funded when the estate has no DNI or if an equitable adjustment is made. When the widow does not receive assets equal in
value to the estate's marital deduction, the amount of the marital deduction should be reduced. 179
These possible challenges to the marital deduction are theoretical and are not supported by any cases. Nevertheless, the
analysis is not farfetched or unrealistic. In 1983 the Connecticut
legislature considered the possibility real enough to warrant legislation prohibiting equitable adjustments that might affect a
QTIP marital trust.180 The mere possibility that the marital deduction might not be allowed for the full amount contemplated
by the decedent's will should prompt cautious estate planners to
adopt drafting solutions.
IV. DRAFTING PROPOSALS

Although equitable adjustments may cause potential tax
problems, careful drafting can resolve or at least minimize those
problems. No one drafting solution, however, is suitable for all
clients; different situations require different approaches.
A. Protecting the Marital Deduction
Any equitable adjustment that arguably affects the marital
deduction should be prohibited. 18 1 The particular provisions
178. For simplicity sake, it is assumed that the $500,000 is cash.
179. This is not a problem that someone must bear because no one benefits as with
IRD. If the marital share receives DNI, then someone else will receive a benefit, accumulated income, without having to pay income taxes.
180. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-100d(d) (West 1981 & Supp. 1986).
181. At least two commentators agree. See Blattmachr, Tax Effects, supra note 2, 1
1414; Moore, Conflicts, supra note 2, 1 606.4. But see Evans, supra note 61, at 1183-85.
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needed will vary depending on who serves as executor. If the client names an independent executor, a will clause such as the
following would permit equitable adjustments and protect the
182
marital deduction:
My executor shall have the discretion, but shall not be required, to make adjustments in the rights of any beneficiaries,
or among the principal and income accounts, to compensate for
the consequences of any tax decision or election, or of any investment or administrative decision, that my executor believes
has had the effect, directly or indirectly, of preferring one beneficiary or group of beneficiaries over others; provided, however, my executor shall not exercise his discretion in a manner
that causes the loss or reduction of the marital or charitable 183 deduction as may herein be provided.""
If the executor is also a beneficiary, the discretionary power
to make an equitable adjustment must be limited in a manner
that conforms with Treasury Regulation sections 20.2041-1(b)(1)
and 25.2514-1(b)(1). As discussed above, a power to allocate between principal and income held in a fiduciary capacity is probably not a general power of appointment. 18 5 Two will provisions
are suggested for the beneficiary-executor situation.
First, the will should require that any general power to allocate receipts between principal and income only be exercisable
in a fiduciary capacity. This result can also be accomplished if
the will specifies that the executor holds all powers in a fiduciary
capacity. Second, the power to make equitable adjustments
should be classified as a power to allocate receipts and disburse182. The effectiveness of marital deduction savings clauses is not free of doubt. See
Rev. Rul. 65-144, 1965-1 C.B. 442. In Rev. Rul. 75-440, 1975-2 C.B. 372, however, the
Service ruled that it would honor the effect of savings clauses if, from a reading of the
entire document, the disqualifying power was not intended to apply to the marital trust.
Since the savings provision proposed in this Article is a part of the same sentence granting the power to make equitable adjustments, there can be little doubt that the testator
does not intend for the disqualifying power to effect the marital deduction. In many
ways the proposed savings provision is similar to the restriction found in Upjohn v. Commissioner, 1972-2 U.S.T.C. 12,888 (W.D. Mich. 1972). For a further discussion of marital deduction savings clauses, see R. CovEy, supra note 2, at 181-82.
183. Although not discussed in this Article, the charitable deduction should be protected in the same manner as the marital deduction.
184. This form is adapted, with minor alteration, from R. WILKIUNS, supra note 163,
Form 13.90W, at 419 (as amended in NEWS FROM DRAFTING WILLs AND TRusT AGREEMENTS: A SYsTEMs APPROACH, April-May 1986, at 1).
185. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
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ments. This provision strengthens the argument that the power
to make the adjustment is protected by Treasury Regulation
section 25.2514-1(b)(1). A possible form might read as follows:
My executor, as the fiduciary of my estate, shall have the
discretion, but shall not be required, when allocating receipts
of my estate between income and principal,to make adjustments in the rights of any beneficiaries, or among the principal
and income accounts to compensate for the consequences of
any tax decision or election, or of any investment or administrative decision, that my executor believes has had the effect,
directly or indirectly, of preferring one beneficiary or group of
beneficiaries over others; provided, however, my executor shall
not exercise his discretion in a manner that would cause the
loss or reduction of the marital or charitable deduction as may
herein be provided.
B. Directing the Section 642(g) Election
The drafting solutions set out above are not the only
choices. For larger estates, it may be advisable to eliminate the
need for a Warms adjustment by prohibiting the section 642(g)
election to deduct estate administration expenses on income tax
returns. 8 ' While this forgoes any current income tax deduction,
it increases the amount of the residuary and decreases the size
of the marital deduction and of the surviving spouse's potential
estate.
It may not be advisable, however, to forgo the section 642(g)
election if the potential surviving spouse 18 7 is young and the
time value of the income tax savings outweigh the additional estate taxes at the second spouse's death. It is also not advisable
when the value of both spouses' combined estates is less than
$1,200,000. In that situation, because no federal estate tax liability will arise at the second death, the income tax savings are the

186. Of course, this recommendation is subject to how a testator might view the
potential shift of assets between the marital share and the residuary illustrated in example 3.
187. When clients make their estate plans, it is, of course, unknown which spouse
will die first and how old each spouse will be at the time of death. Estate planners must
assume, when preparing documents, that clients may die shortly after the documents are
prepared. In time, the client's documents may need to be amended as a result of changed
circumstances, such as increased age.
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only tax savings available.
The section 642(g) election is not the only source of tax
election problems. Unless Congress enacts the House version of
the 1986 Tax Reform legislation, which eliminates the concept of
DNI, 188 distributions of principal that are treated as income
might cause problems as well. A testator, therefore, might wish
to grant the executor a power to make equitable adjustments to
overcome the inequities caused by a distribution of principal
treated as income, while at the same time prohibiting the section
642(g) election. All other potential adjustments might also be
prohibited, except to the extent that the marital or charitable
deduction is affected. Such a provision might read as follows:
My executor may not elect to deduct estate administration
expenses on any income tax returns of my estate as permitted
by Internal Revenue Code section 642(g). My executor shall
have the discretion, but shall not be required, to make adjustments in the rights of any beneficiaries, or among the principal
and income accounts, to compensate for the consequences of
distributions of estate principal considered income as a result
of Internal Revenue Code sections 661 and 662; provided, however, my executor shall not exercise his discretion in a manner
that causes the loss or reduction of the marital or charitable
deduction as may herein be provided. My executor may not
make any other adjustments in the rights of any beneficiaries,
or among the principal and income accounts, to compensate for
the consequences of any other tax decision or election, or of
any investment or administrative decision; provided, however,
my executor shall make any adjustments as are necessary to
prevent the loss or reduction of the marital or charitable deduction as may herein be provided.
The following provision can be used to deny the section
642(g) election and to permit the beneficiary-executor to make a
Holloway adjustment:
My executor may not elect to deduct estate administration
expenses on any income tax returns of my estate as permitted
by Internal Revenue Code section 642(g). My executor, as the
fiduciary of my estate, shall have the discretion, but shall not
be required, when allocating receipts of my estate between income and principal,to make adjustments in the rights of any

188. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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beneficiaries, or among the principal and income accounts to
compensate for the consequences of distributions of estate
principal being considered income as a result of Internal Revenue Code section 661 and 662; provided, however, my executor
shall not exercise his discretion in a manner that causes the
loss or reduction of the marital or charitable deduction as may
herein be provided. My executor shall not make any other adjustments in the rights of any beneficiaries, or among the principal and income accounts to compensate for the consequences
of any tax decision or election, or of any investment or administrative decision; provided, however, my executor shall make
any adjustments as are necessary to prevent the loss or reduction of the marital or charitable deduction as may herein be
provided.
C. ProhibitingEquitable Adjustments

As a final alternative, a testator might prohibit all discretionary equitable adjustments. To ensure that the marital deduction is not lost or reduced for failure to make an equitable
adjustment, the draftsman should add a proviso that protects
the marital deduction. A provision to prohibit equitable adjustments might read as follows:
My executor shall not make adjustments in the rights of
any beneficiaries, or among the principal and income accounts,
to compensate for the consequences of any tax decision or election, or of any investment or administrative decision; provided,
however, my executor shall make any adjustments as are necessary to prevent the loss or reduction of the marital or charitable deduction as may herein be provided.
The draftsman should not use a provision that directs equitable adjustments. Potential equitable adjustments are numerous, and a direction to make adjustments might cause a fiduciary to make all possible adjustments.1 8 This would be an
administrative nightmare for the executor and is not likely to be
cost effective.
One question remains: should the testator affirmatively prohibit equitable adjustments or is silence on the issue enough?

189. Carrico, Equitable Adjustments, supra note 2, discusses 18 different potential

equitable adjustments.
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Unfortunately, silence probably is not a prudent course of action
in states that do not have well-defined parameters for equitable
adjustments. The tax issues alluded to above all depend on the
beneficiary having a right to the equitable adjustment. If no
right to an equitable adjustment exists, either because it is in
the discretion of the executor or because it is prohibited, the
worst of the beneficiary's problems disappear. For the executorbeneficiary, it is better for the testator to limit the power to
make adjustments than to rely on state law to bring the beneficiary-executor within the safe harbor of Treasury Regulation
section 25.2514-1(b)(1).
V.

CONCLUSION

Equitable adjustments are complex, and their tax consequences uncharted. Only in states where the legislature or the
courts have established definite parameters do estate planners
have a solid basis for evaluating the issues. In the states where
neither the courts nor the legislature have acted, the estate planner stands on uncertain ground.
The discussion of the tax issues in this Article is, in many
instances, theoretical and speculative. Only one tax case has
given any consideration to the tax ramifications of equitable adjustments. 190 Nevertheless, the drafting suggestions set out
above can protect estates, beneficiaries, executors, and estate
planners from the potential problems. Unfortunately, no one solution can resolve every situation. Client circumstances and
needs vary, and the drafting responses must be sensitive to these
differences.

190. Estate of Britenstool v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 711 (1966).
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